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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Evidence
ADMISSIBILITY OF FORMER TESTIMONY WHERE WITNESS UN-
AVAILABLE-NEcESSITY OF PRIviTY OF PARTIEs-FuR-
THER TRIAL OF CASE
In Lord v. Boschert, 47 Ohio App. 54, 189 N.E. 863, 40 O.L.R.
97, 16 Abs. i8o. (Hamilton County, January 22, 1934) plaintiff
brought an action for loss of consortium of his wife, who was injured in
a collision between his car and that of the defendant, the injury being
caused, as he claimed, by the negligent driving of the defendant. The
plaintiff offered a transcript of the testimony of one Noelcke who had
testified in the action by the plaintiff's wife against the defendant for
her own injury. Noelcke died before the plaintiff's action was tried.
The appellate court held that the evidence was not admissible since the
plaintiff's action was not a further trial of the case as required by section
11496 of the statute.
The above statutee provides that after the death of a witness who
had previously testified and upon following the proper procedure, the
evidence may be received upon a further trial of the case. The statute
does not provide that former testimony shall not be admitted in any other
situation. Obviously, the offered testimony does not come within the
wording of the statute, but such statutes are not usually regarded as
setting forth all the grounds of admissibility. "It is here even dearer
than in the case of depositions that the statutory enumeration of condi-
tions of admissibility is not to be taken as exclusive." Wigmore, Vol. 3,
section 1413, 2nd ed. (1923).
At common law testimony of a witness in a former trial of an
action between the same parties was competent. This type of testimony
is regarded by most courts and textwriters as hearsay. Hearsay is usu-
ally defined as a statement made at some other time than the trial of a
case when offered for the truths of the facts contained therein. Inas-
much as Noelcke did not testify at the present trial but at a previous
one it comes under the category of hearsay evidence. Hearsay or not,
it offered some guarantee of trustworthiness, since it had been subjected
to an oath and cross-examination. The law objects to hearsay evidence
because it does not trust it. Where particular types of hearsay seem
unusually trustworthy the law may admit them by making an exception
to the hearsay rule. Testimony at a former trial offers a greater guar-
antee of trustworthiness than the average hearsay. Therefore the law
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will generally admit such testimony whenever the absence of the wit-
ness is satisfactorily accounted for and the cause of action is between the
same parties. This is the result reached under our modern decisions
following the common law.
The common law rule admitted not only testimony in previous
actions between the same parties but included also testimony between
parties in privity with them. The law relaxed the rule to the extent
of recognizing privity between the parties to the two suits as a sufficient
compliance with the requirement of identity of parties. When the pre-
vious action was not between the same parties or parties in privity with
them some courts automatically excluded evidence of prior testimony.
Examples of this rigid view can be found in Anderson v. Hultbery, 247
Fed. 273, 248 U.S. 581 (1918), testimony taken at prior trial before
arbitrators concerning the same trial, where plaintiff was neither party
nor privy excluded. Technical privity and mutauality were necessary in
Metropolitan Street R. R. v. Ganby, 199 Fed. 192 (19OO). There,
the first suit was by the injured minor through his guardian, grand-
mother, and the second suit was by the mother for loss of the child's
services. Testimony, taken in the first case, of a witness later deceased,
was excluded in the second on the ground of lack of privity. In Lem-
mons v. State, 129 Ala. 41, 29 So. 929 (1929), the testimony at a
trial of another person for the same offense was excluded. The Michi-
gan court in Waterhause v. Waterhause, 130 Mich. 89, 89 N.W.
(1902) stated that lack of privity will exclude former testimony where
the testimony in the first trial in which the plaintiff was then party in
interest, but in the second action was plaintiff only as next best friend.
The issues in both cases were identical as well as the defendants in the
separate actions.
Technical privity is lacking in the principal case of Lord v. Bos-
shert supra. Here we have the same dependant, the same injury, and
the same issue, namely, negligence of defendant in causing injuries to
Bertha Lord. However, the two plaintiffs in the two actions do not
conform to the technical rule of privity. Hence, applying the strict
application of the common law doctrine the former testimony of the
deceased witness, Noelcke, is inadmissible. The few Ohio cases on this
issue also follow the strict common law rule. This rule was laid down
in Wagers v. Dickey, 17 Ohio 439, 49 A.D. 467 (1856). The court
in Hoover v. Jennings, Ii Ohio St. 624 (186o) held in a suit by an
administrators that it was not competent for him to show on the trial
what was testified to by his intestate on a former trial. Depositions were
not admissible against parties brought in after the depositions were taken
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in Bryan v. O'Connor, 41 Ohio St. 368, 6o Dec. Rep. 1095, 6 W.L.B.
819 (1884). However, in McCloskey v. Barr, 47 Fed. 154, 165
(U.S. Circuit Court, Ohio, i89i) depositions of a life tenant, taken to
show ownership of fee, was admitted under the present Ohio Statute
Section 12221 in a partition suit to show identity of co-tenants out of
possession. Property issue was regarded as placing parties in privity.
A case similar to the principal case is Oliver v. Ry. Co., 32 S.W. 759
(Ky.). The court excluded in the action for personal injuries by the
wife, the testimony taken in a former action by the husband for loss of
consortium against the same defendant for the same injuries.
The requirement of identity of parties is based on the ideas that the
party against whom the evidence is offered should have an opportunity
to cross-examine. It might be argued that the evidence should be
admitted if some one with the same incentive as the party had an op-
portunity to cross-examine. In many cases, as in the actions of Lord
and his wife against the defendant, the principal points to be litigated
are the same, that is, the negligence of the parties, the extent of the
injuries and the responsible cause of the collision. However, the law
usually protects the litigant by giving him an opportunity to cross-examine
personally. The rule is relaxed, nevertheless, when testimony in former
trials between parties in privity is admitted. The privity test seems to
be based on precedent rather than reasoning. If evidence in former
trials should be admitted, it should be because of its inherent trustworthi-
ness rather than because of the presence or absence of technical privity.
Privity is often important in property law but there seems no sufficient
reason for making it a test of the admissibility of evidence. If Mrs.
Lord's judgment against the defendant had been reversed and a new
trial held, a transcript of Noelcke's testimony would have been clearly
admissible on the second trial. There would have been as much and
no more reason to credit the testimony in the supposed case as in the
actual one, yet in the first case the testimony would have been received,
and in the second, excluded.
Illustration of admissibility without strict privity can be found in the
following cases: In Paton v. Great Northern Railway, 135 Minn. 154,
16o N.W. 67o (1916) the father as the guardian brought an action
for his son's injuries. A testified but soon after died. Later in the
father's own action for loss of the boy's services A's testimony taken in
the first action was received. The fact the father was a nominal plain-
tiff only in the first case and the real party in interest in the second did
not exclude A's testimony taken in the first suit. The former testimony
was admitted also in Kreuger v. Sylvester, ioo Iowa, 647, 69 N.W.
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1059 (1897). The first case was a criminal proceeding by the state
against the same defendant for assault and battery and the former
testimony given in the criminal action was admitted in the later civil
action. The court stated that "the admissibility of such evidence seems
to turn on right of cross-examination rather than the precise identity of
parties." In dtlanta W. P. R. Go. v. Venable, 67 Ga. 697 (1881)
the former party was the mother suing for personal injuries; the present
party was her child suing for her mother's death from those injuries.
The former testimony given in the mother's own action was admitted.
In re Dumont, 8o Conn. 140, 67 At. 497 (1897). The testimony of
a deceased witness before a bar association grievance committee on
charges against respondent was admitted in a disbarment proceeding,
the court stated: "the requirement of identity of parties is only a means
to an end; . . . the issues were substantially the same, and nothing
more is necessary in that regard."
It should be noticed that in Lord v. Boschert, the suits were against
the same defendant and that he had ample opportunity to cross-examine.
Most of the issues were the same but in the principal case the plaintiff
was suing for loss of consortium while in the former case the wife sued
for own injury. The defendant had the same incentive to cross-examine
in one case as the other. A common argument for the defendant in this
type of case is that testimony could not be used against the present
plaintiff and so should not be admitted for him. The equitable theory
of mutuality is offered as a test of admissibility of evidence. Yet mu-
tuality seems no more satisfactory than privity as a test. Good character
may be offered by the defendant; bad character cannot be offered by
the state unless the dependant opens the door. A confession made before
trial may be received against the defendant; a third party's admission of
guilt made out of court will not be received by the courts of most states.
Testimony against a defendant for arson in criminal case is by a ma-
jority of the states admissible for the insurance company in a later action
against it for destruction of the same building.
It would seem that, whenever the two cases present the same issue
and facts and the defendant has previously had an opportunity to cross-
examine the witness who has since become unavailable for the later
case, such former testimony should not be excluded. Since the objec-
tion to hearsay is based upon a want of trustworthiness, the evidence
should not be barred when the trustworthiness is sufficiently established
by such an opportunity to cross-examine. On principle this testimony
should be admissible whether there is technical privity or not.
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